Judah Maccabee’s Epic Battles: Defying an Empire

The Beginning of the Revolt and the Battle Against Apollonius

The origins of organized popular resistance against religious decrees began with the charismatic act of Mattathias in Modi’in. Acts of resistance against the authorities likely occurred simultaneously in various locations. Mattathias’ public act served as a signal for the rural population to rise, uniting them around the leadership of the Hasmonean family. The boldness and initiative to strike at regime representatives undoubtedly stemmed from the unique personalities of Mattathias and his sons, natives of the area. However, since Mattathias himself was in Jerusalem during the early days of the decrees and refrained from reacting to the Seleucid actions in the city, it appears that geographical and demographic factors also contributed to making Modi’in the site of the most severe spontaneous outbreak against the authorities.

About two kilometers east of Modi’in lies a complex valley between the steep western slopes of the mountain ridges and the lowland hills. It is reasonable to assume that the authorities avoided enforcing the decrees in the heart of the mountainous strongholds of the ridges, focusing their efforts on more accessible areas, such as the highland plateau north and south of Jerusalem and the lowland hills, which were also close to Seleucid fortresses in Acra, Gezer, and the coastal plain. Indeed, Modi’in is located in terrain that is easy to access and navigate, which likely explains why Seleucid troops and officials appeared there to enforce the religious decrees. On the other hand, Modi’in’s proximity to the steep and rugged western slopes of the mountainous region gave Mattathias and his followers confidence that they could find immediate refuge and reorganize in the nearby mountains before a massive military response could be mounted. The closeness to their home base likely rallied the residents of nearby villages, facilitating logistical support.

According to the account in 1 Maccabees, Mattathias and his sons fled to the mountains, while another group of “seekers of justice” found refuge in the desert. The sources do not provide a more precise location for the rebels’ gathering place. Avi-Yonah hypothesized that the primary organizational base was in the Gophna Hills, east of Modi’in. This view is plausible due to the area’s proximity to Modi’in and its later mention as a refuge following the failure at the Battle of Beth-Zechariah. The region’s characteristics made it an ideal base for guerrilla forces: most mountain ridges are highly rugged and difficult to access. Caves and crevices hidden in their slopes could serve as hideouts against enemies penetrating the area, and the high peaks allowed for optimal observation of the northern and western routes into the Judean highlands.

The rebels’ initial actions, described in 1 Maccabees in both prose and a somewhat vague poetic passage, suggest that their primary efforts were directed against Hellenized Jews and their supporters rather than the Seleucid regime and its forces in Judea. This indicates that the garrison in Acra, which appears to have been the only Seleucid fortress within the Judean highlands, was forced to limit its oversight to the city itself, lacking the workforce and capacity to restore order in the northern mountainous regions.

The campaign of Apollonius, the “strategos” of Samaria, was the first response by a Seleucid force summoned from outside Judea against Judah Maccabee and his men. Since it took place after Mattathias’ death, it can be dated to 166 BCE. “When Maccabee was in the field, the Gentiles could not withstand him, for the wrath of God had turned to mercy. Coming unexpectedly upon cities and villages, he burned them after selecting suitable locations, driving away many enemies. He often used the cover of night to aid such assaults, and his reputation for courage spread everywhere” (2 Maccabees). There is no doubt that these verses also refer to the confrontations with Apollonius and Seron. Attacking the enemy from weak positions while exploiting the element of surprise, sometimes through night warfare, aligns with Judah Maccabee’s tactics in the battle against Seron and the campaign at Emmaus. It is reasonable to assume that the confrontation with Apollonius followed a similar pattern. Apollonius gathered Gentiles and a large army from Samaria to fight against Israel. Judah learned of this, went out to meet him, struck him, and killed him. Many fell, and the survivors fled. Judah took their spoils, and he seized Apollonius’ sword, which he used in battle for the rest of his days” (Antiquities of the Jews).

The Ambush of Seron at the Ascent of Beth-Horon

The battle against Seron, like the confrontation with Apollonius, likely took place shortly after Apollonius’ defeat, still in 166 BCE. The Seleucid campaign to Emmaus, which followed, set out in the autumn of 165 BCE.

“And Seron, the commander of the Syrian army, heard that Judah had gathered a force and a loyal assembly with him, going out to war. He said, ‘I will make a name for myself and be honored in the kingdom, and I will fight Judah and those with him who defy the king’s command.’ He added to his force a large contingent of renegade Jews to assist him in taking vengeance on the sons of Israel. He advanced to the ascent of Beth-Horon, and Judah went out to meet him with a small force.” (1 Maccabees)

Syria in Greek refers to Aram. This officer, bearing a Thracian name, likely commanded one of the Thracian garrisons stationed in the region, possibly in Yavneh, where a Thracian garrison is known to have existed, or perhaps in Gezer. Renegade Jews refer to Hellenized Jews who aided Seron. The ascent of Beth-Horon denotes the steep and challenging section of the road leading from the northern end of the Ayalon Valley to the highland plateau north of Jerusalem, between the Upper and Lower Beth-Horon villages, after which the ascent is named. Seron’s climb up the ascent of Beth-Horon suggests that the campaign aimed to conduct “policing” operations in the area north of Jerusalem, possibly penetrating the nearby Gophna Hills to eliminate rebel strongholds.

The ascent of Beth-Horon lies on one of the northwestern ridges of the Judean highlands, sloping toward the lowlands. The initial part of the route, from the vicinity of the village of Beit Sira at the northern end of the Ayalon Valley to Lower Beth-Horon, is relatively easy. It climbs gradually over four kilometers with a moderate slope across a relatively wide plateau. The difficult section is between Lower and Upper Beth-Horon, requiring an ascent of 225 meters over an aerial distance of 2.8 kilometers. The ridge’s crest is extremely narrow, flanked alternately by steep slopes. The path winds several times, with each bend overlooked by a high hill, beyond which lies a steep and dangerous slope. A small force positioned on these hills could block the passage of a large army ascending the route and cast it into the abyss. Despite these challenges, during the Second Temple period, as in other eras, the ascent of Beth-Horon served as a main route from the west toward Jerusalem and the northern highland plateau, as alternative routes posed even greater difficulties.

“When they saw the army coming against them, they asked Judah, ‘How can we, being so few, fight against such a strong multitude, especially since we are weary and have not eaten today?’ Judah replied, ‘It is easy for many to be delivered into the hands of a few, and there is no difference before Heaven whether to save by many or by few.'” (1 Maccabees)

Seron’s army was confined to a single column, stretched out along the ascent with significant gaps, its flanks exposed to gaping chasms. We have not eaten today, since the ambush was set within Jewish territory, it is unlikely that this resulted from logistical difficulties. The fear stemmed from the state of alertness and the risk of detection faced by the fighters at the ambush site. It is possible that the Seleucid force’s march was delayed due to the challenges of the ascent and the need to advance cautiously to avoid a trap, keeping it in the line of sight of the ambushers. This likely pinned the Jewish force in place for an extended period, preventing them from attending to basic logistical needs.

“For victory in war does not depend on the size of an army, but on strength from Heaven. They come against us with great pride and lawlessness to destroy us, our wives, and our children, and to plunder us. But we fight for our lives and laws, and He will crush them. So do not fear them.” When he finished speaking, he fell upon them suddenly. Seron and his army were routed before him, and they pursued them down the descent of Beth-Horon to the plain. About eight hundred of them fell, and the rest fled to the land of the Philistines. (1 Maccabees)

The exploitation of surprise, the terrain, the pursuit down Beth-Horon, and parallels to other events in the same arena indicate this was an ambush attack. The exact location of the ambush is speculative. Some suggest it was positioned at Hill 665 east of Upper Beth-Horon or on the hill where much of the modern village of Upper Beth-Horon stands. However, Sheikh Abu-Shusha, the ancient tell of Upper Beth-Horon, seems more suitable. This hill offers significant advantages to an ambushing force. It rises about 20 meters above the road, with a steep slope to Wadi Juridun on the other side. This slope, the steepest along the ascent, was once nearly vertical, though modern terraces by local Arab villagers have softened its severity. The path at this point was extremely narrow, as evidenced by remnants of the Roman road visible on-site. The hill’s sides show signs of later quarrying that widened the road’s path.

An ambush at Sheikh Abu-Shusha could easily push those passing below into the abyss. Notably, this point marks the end of the ascent’s most challenging section (a 110-meter climb over 950 meters aerially). Near the hill, the road sharply curves to the right, preventing the ascending force from seeing what lay beyond, heightening their anxiety and hastening their retreat. Even if they overcame this obstacle, Hill 665 further along posed another threat, and retreating would force them to navigate other points down the road where additional blocking forces could be positioned. Finally, the hill dominated the unprotected right flank of the ascending army. Josephus indicates that this spot was where Jewish rebels concentrated their main effort against the army of Cestius Gallus, retreating down Beth-Horon in 66 CE.

It is unlikely that the Seleucid-Thracian force advancing along the ascent fell into a trap without first sending forward scouting units to survey the terrain and ensure no ambushes were set. It appears the ambush force managed to outwit them and remain undetected. The plain refers to the Ayalon Valley, about four kilometers southwest of Lower Beth-Horon.

“The fear of Judah and his brothers and dread fell upon the Gentiles around them. His fame reached the king, and the nations spoke of Judah’s battles.” (1 Maccabees)

The Ceremony of Judah Maccabee at Mizpah and the Campaign at Emmaus

The Battle of Emmaus occurred in the autumn of 165 BCE, approximately three years after the imposition of the religious decrees and the outbreak of the revolt. Significant events in the Seleucid Empire preceded this campaign. Antiochus Epiphanes assembled his army in Syria, even showcasing it at the famous festival in Daphne. Upon completing preparations, he embarked on a major expedition to conquer Armenia and subdue the “upper satrapies.” The western part of the empire was entrusted to the regent Lysias. At this stage, suppressing the revolt in Judea was not yet a central priority for the authorities, who were preoccupied with more pressing issues. Thus, they did not actively intervene for about a year following the defeats of Apollonius and Seron. However, they began to pay attention to the deteriorating situation in Judea, and the initiative and handling of the matter shifted from junior officers and governors to Ptolemy son of Dorymenes, who was appointed governor of the satrapy of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, which included Judea.

“When Antiochus heard these things, he was enraged and sent orders to gather all the forces of his kingdom, a very large army. He opened his treasuries and paid his troops for a year, commanding them to be ready for any need. But he saw that the money in the treasuries was depleted, and the tributes from the land were meager due to the conflict and the calamity he had brought upon the land in his attempt to abolish the laws that had existed from ancient times.” (1 Maccabees)

He sent orders to gather all the forces of his kingdom—the Seleucid army consisted of military settlers scattered throughout the empire, auxiliary forces from subjugated peoples, allies, vassals, and mercenaries. These forces were not concentrated in one place year-round and had to be summoned to northern Syria before any significant military operation.

“He feared that he would not have enough, as in times past, for expenses and gifts, which he had previously given with a lavish hand, surpassing the earlier kings. Greatly distressed, he resolved to go to Persia to collect the tributes of those lands and amass great wealth.” (1 Maccabees)

When Antiochus Epiphanes sought to pay the soldiers gathered for the campaign to Judea, he opened his treasuries and realized they were nearly empty. This sparked his fear that he could not display his past extravagance, prompting him to travel to Persia, where he hoped to raise substantial funds. The text thus portrays the expedition to Persia as a consequence of the crisis in Judea, presenting the revolt as a central event in the empire’s affairs.

“He left Lysias, a distinguished man of royal lineage, in charge of the king’s affairs from the Euphrates River to the borders of Egypt, and to raise his son Antiochus until his return. He entrusted him with half the army and the elephants, instructing him regarding all his desires and concerning the inhabitants of Judea and Jerusalem: to send an army against them to crush and destroy the strength of Israel and the remnant of Jerusalem, and to erase their memory from the place.” (1 Maccabees)

To raise his son Antiochus—the young Antiochus, later Antiochus V, was about nine years old at the time of his father’s death, meaning he was around seven or eight at the start of the expedition.

“To settle foreigners in all their territory and distribute their land. The king took the remaining half of the army and departed from Antioch, his royal city, in the year 147 [of the Seleucid era], crossed the Euphrates River, and passed through the upper lands. Lysias chose Ptolemy’s son, Dorymenes, Nicanor, and Gorgias, mighty men among the king’s friends.” (1 Maccabees)

Nicanor held a high noble title, Gorgias was an experienced military man who later, after the purification of the Temple, served as the “strategos” of Idumea (the Hebron Hills), and Ptolemy son of Dorymenes was the military and civilian governor of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, the satrapy encompassing the Land of Israel. In this campaign, Gorgias served only as a deputy commander of the expeditionary force, while supreme command rested with Nicanor. The sources mention Gorgias in this battle, contrary to their usual practice of naming only the chief commander, due to his role in a special task force that played a central part in the campaign.

“He sent them with forty thousand men and seven thousand cavalry to invade the land of Judea and destroy it as the king commanded. They set out with all their forces and came and encamped near Emmaus in the plain.” (1 Maccabees) The figure of 40,000 soldiers is exaggerated compared to 2 Maccabees, which mentions 20,000.

The springs, settled status, and especially the unique geographical location of Emmaus explain why it was chosen as a campsite: Emmaus lies at the eastern end of the Ayalon Valley, a wide breach in the lowland hills that allows easy movement toward the western slopes of the Judean highlands. It is only about 10 kilometers from the entrance to the ascent of Beth-Horon, and several alternative routes to Jerusalem branch off nearby. Though more difficult and dangerous than Beth-Horon and unsuitable for daily traffic, these routes were viable in case Beth-Horon was blocked or for combined maneuvers. Following earlier failures, the Seleucid forces were aware of the challenges of penetrating the Judean highlands from the west. They therefore positioned themselves near Emmaus, at the junction of several routes, aiming to clear them gradually and ensure a steady, surprise-free ascent to the highland plateau north of Jerusalem. It is also possible that the Seleucid commanders planned to split their army and advance into the Judean highlands simultaneously via multiple routes, preventing Judah Maccabee from ambushing the entire force. Alternatively, the Seleucid strategy may have been inherently passive, with the primary goal of “luring” Judah Maccabee into skirmishes around Emmaus. This consideration explains why Gorgias returned to Emmaus after losing track of Judah at Mizpah. In any case, Emmaus was an ideal location for a military encampment: the fertile valley provided a solid logistical base, the Hellenized local population could be relied upon, and the residents were obligated to supply the soldiers’ needs, as was customary in Hellenistic law for rural settlements.

“The merchants of the land heard of their fame, took great quantities of silver and shackles, and came to the camp to enslave the sons of Israel. Forces from Syria and the land of the Philistines joined them. Judah and his brothers saw that troubles had multiplied, and the army was encamped in their territory. They learned of the king’s orders to destroy and annihilate the people, and they said to one another, ‘Let us restore the ruins of our people and fight for our people and the sanctuary.’ The assembly gathered to prepare for war, pray, and seek mercy and compassion.” (1 Maccabees)

Merchants of the land—merchants accompanied Hellenistic armies as “service contractors” within the civilian logistical framework common in those armies.

“Jerusalem was desolate as a wilderness; none of her offspring went in or out. The sanctuary was trampled, and foreigners were in the Acra, a dwelling place for Gentiles. Joy was taken from Jacob, and the flute and lyre ceased. They gathered and came to Mizpah, opposite Jerusalem, for Mizpah was a place of prayer for Israel in former times.” (1 Maccabees) Mizpah refers to the area of the tomb of the prophet Samuel.

“They fasted that day, put on sackcloth, sprinkled ashes on their heads, and tore their clothes. They unrolled the Torah scrolls, which the Gentiles had sought to inscribe with images of their idols. They brought the priestly garments, the first fruits, and the tithes and shaved the Nazirites who had completed their days.” (1 Maccabees)

“They cried out loudly to Heaven, saying, ‘What shall we do with these, and where shall we take them? Your sanctuary is trampled and profaned, and your priests are in mourning and humiliation. Behold, the Gentiles have gathered against us to destroy us; You know what they plot against us. How can we stand before them unless You help us?’ They sounded the trumpets and cried out with a great voice. Afterward, Judah appointed leaders of the people: commanders of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens. They told those building houses, betrothed to wives, planting vineyards, or faint-hearted to return home, as prescribed by the Torah.” (1 Maccabees)

Commanders of thousands—the Jewish force, numbering 6,000 men, was divided into four units (in Hellenistic terminology, a phalanx unit of 256 fighters), each comprising 1,500 fighters, led by four of the five Hasmonean brothers. Dividing into small squads of no more than 10 men, grouped into larger units, was essential for efficiently executing a long-range night march, as conducted in this campaign.

“They struck camp and encamped south of Emmaus. Judah said, ‘Gird yourselves and be valiant men, and be ready in the morning to fight these Gentiles who have gathered against us to destroy us and our sanctuary, for it is better to die in battle than to witness the calamities of our people and the holy places. As Heaven wills, so it shall be done.” (1 Maccabees)

“Gorgias took five thousand men and a thousand choice cavalry and set out by night to fall upon the Jewish camp and strike them suddenly, with the sons of the Acra as their guides. Judah heard of this, and he and the valiant men set out to strike the king’s forces at Emmaus while the army was still scattered outside the camp.” (1 Maccabees)

Set out by night—the sequence of events suggests that Judah Maccabee found a way to inform the Seleucid command of the Jewish force’s concentration at Mizpah to “lure” part of the Seleucid army to the highland plateau. This was achieved either through an intentional “leak” or a conspicuous action, such as the public ceremony itself, which likely drew the attention of the Hellenized locals and their supporters collaborating with the authorities.

“Gorgias came to Judah’s camp by night and found no one. He searched for them in the mountains, saying, ‘They are fleeing from us.’ But at dawn, Judah appeared in the valley with three thousand men, though they lacked shields and swords as they desired.” (1 Maccabees)

Judah Maccabee left burning torches in the camp to deceive the enemy, and Gorgias wasted precious time searching the highland plateau while Judah was already near the Seleucid camp.

Appeared in the valley—since Judah’s temporary encampment was south of Emmaus, it is likely that the Jewish force advanced toward the Seleucid camp from the southeast, the shortest route. The Jewish force conducted reconnaissance of the Seleucid camp, observing its full extent before the assault. The initial combat contact occurred in hilly terrain, and eventually, part of the Seleucid camp fled toward Idumea after the clash. The appearance indicates that Seleucid cavalry patrols or hilltop lookouts detected the Jewish force’s movement toward the saddle. However, the early warning did not benefit the drowsy and complacent Seleucid camp, as the time available for organization was too short. Moreover, Judah Maccabee and his men charged from the saddle, exploiting a height advantage, and the Seleucid camp in the Ayalon Valley was too “cramped” for organized combat.

With three thousand men, a night march of 3,000 soldiers along the routes from Mizpah to the area south of Emmaus- an extremely challenging operation requiring exceptional fighter fitness, efficient command, and top-tier navigation skills. Likely, such a force did not move along a single axis, and these were elite units from a substantial “standing army” that had lived in guerrilla conditions for at least two years, presumably trained for such missions. Judah Maccabee’s plan, far from impromptu, relied on the availability of forces suited for dangerous and complex operations.

They lacked shields and swords—the Jewish army’s armament was still significantly deficient at this early stage. Previous victories were against smaller forces, and the captured weapons were insufficient to equip all fighters.

“They saw a strong, fortified Gentile camp, with cavalry surrounding it, and they were trained for war. Judah told the men, ‘Do not fear their multitude or dread their charge. Remember how our ancestors were saved at the Red Sea when Pharaoh pursued them with a great army. Now let us cry out to Heaven, that He may have mercy on us, remember the covenant with our forefathers, and destroy this camp before us today. Then all the Gentiles will know there is a Redeemer and Savior for Israel.’ The foreigners raised their eyes and saw them approaching from the opposite side.” (1 Maccabees)

They saw a camp—when the Jewish force reached the saddle between Latrun and Emmaus, the Seleucid camp was revealed in all its might.

Cavalry surrounding it—even in the classical period, army camps were protected during the day by cavalry patrols, which likely circled the Ayalon Valley and may have been the ones to detect Judah’s men on their approach.

The foreigners raised their eyes—the Jewish force ascending the saddle was fully exposed to the soldiers in the camp. It is possible that the sun, rising in the southeast at dawn, blinded the enemy during the attack, granting an additional advantage to the assaulting force. The Seleucid camp near Emmaus likely had a relatively calm atmosphere, as the command was convinced that Gorgias had surprised Judah Maccabee at Mizpah, and they had no reason for excessive concern, as Judah had previously avoided operating in open terrain.

“They went out from the camp to battle, and those with Judah sounded the trumpets. They engaged, struck the Gentiles, and they fled to the plain. All the rearguard fell by the sword, and they pursued them as far as Gezer, the plains of Idumea, Ashdod, and Yavneh. About three thousand of them fell. Judah and the domestically trained army returned from the pursuit, and he said to the people, ‘Do not covet the spoils, for a battle is still before us.'” (1 Maccabees)

Those with Judah sounded the trumpets—in this case, the trumpet blasts were intended to encourage the troops before and during the charge, instill fear in the enemy, possibly simulate a larger force, and coordinate between units.

They pursued them as far as Gezer, located 7 kilometers northwest of Emmaus, the nearest Seleucid fortress in the area.

‘Gorgias and his army are in the mountains near us. Now stand against our enemies and fight them, and afterward take the spoils freely.’ While Judah was still speaking, a detachment appeared, looking out from the mountain. They saw that their forces had been routed and were burning the camp, for the visible smoke revealed what had happened. When they saw this, they were greatly afraid, and when they saw Judah’s army in the plain ready for battle, they all fled to the land of the Philistines. Judah returned to plunder the camp, taking much gold, silver, blue and purple fabrics, and great wealth.” (1 Maccabees)

Burning the camp—setting fire to the camp before plundering it was likely intended to create the impression that the Jews had a large force. Wary of facing Gorgias’ elite troops, Judah Maccabee sought to deter them in this way.

Fled to the land of the Philistines—the Jewish force was too exhausted at this stage to pursue the enemy, and may have feared engaging Gorgias’ elite Seleucid fighters. Judah Maccabee aimed to prevent the Seleucid army from regrouping near Emmaus, so he repositioned in the valley. However, as the enemy began to retreat, further pursuit was unnecessary.

“On their return, they sang praises to Heaven, for He is good, for His mercy endures forever. And there was great deliverance in Israel that day.” (1 Maccabees)

Lysias’ First Campaign and the Raid Near Beth-Zur

The failure of the Emmaus campaign, initiated by Ptolemy’s son, Dorymenes, marked a serious turning point in the situation in Judea, necessitating the direct intervention of the regent Lysias, Ptolemy’s immediate superior, who was also responsible for the western part of the Seleucid Empire. This was the first of Lysias’ two campaigns to Judea. Like the Battle of Emmaus, this campaign occurred while much of the Seleucid army was with Antiochus Epiphanes in the east, significantly limiting the numerical strength of the forces sent to Judea.

“Those who escaped from the Gentiles came and reported all that had happened to Lysias. He was dismayed and enraged when he heard, for things had not gone as he wished with Israel, nor had the king’s orders been fulfilled. The following year, he mustered sixty thousand choice men and five thousand cavalry to wage war against them. They marched to Idumea and encamped at Beth-Zur. Judah met them with ten thousand men.” (1 Maccabees)

The Battle of Beth-Zur took place about a year after the Battle of Emmaus, in the autumn of 164 BCE, a few months before the purification of the Temple in Kislev 164 BCE. This time, the Seleucids ascended the central mountain ridge from the southwest through Idumea. Previous attempts to suppress the revolt had failed due to the difficulty of ascending the Judean highlands from the west. Although the southern and southwestern routes were also challenging, they passed through friendly Idumean territory. The Idumean population allowed the Seleucids to reach the highland plateau unhindered and provided them with a solid intelligence and logistical base.

They encamped at Beth-Zur—the site has been definitively identified with Khirbet et-Tubeika, a tell located on the northwestern edge of the village of Halhul, about one kilometer from the main road. Beth-Zur was not directly on the main route and could not physically block the northward movement of Seleucid forces. However, advancing north without first capturing Beth-Zur and stationing a garrison there would have been risky in the event of a defeat, as the Jews could have cut off the Seleucid retreat route. The unique geographical conditions of the area meant that all movement options from the Hebron Hills to the Judean highlands converged into a narrow strip, only 2–3 kilometers wide, with Beth-Zur at its center.

It is reasonable to assume that Lysias encamped near Beth-Zur, besieged it, captured it, and transferred part of the Seleucid camp there to garrison the fortress and prepare for the continuation of the campaign. The clash with Judah Maccabee occurred during Lysias’ consolidation efforts at Beth-Zur.

“Seeing the strong camp, he prayed, saying, ‘Blessed are You, Savior of Israel, who broke the fury of the mighty one by the hand of Your servant David and delivered the Philistine camp into the hands of Jonathan son of Saul and his armor-bearer. Deliver this camp into the hands of your people, Israel, and let them be ashamed of their army and cavalry. Fill them with fear, melt the boldness of their strength, and let them tremble in their ruin. Strike them down with the sword of those who love You, and let all who know Your name praise You with hymns.’ They engaged in battle, and about five thousand men from Lysias’ camp fell. When Lysias saw the blow struck against his army and the courage of Judah and his men, who were ready to live or die heroically, he departed for Antioch, gathered a large force of mercenaries, and planned to return to Judea. Judah said to his brothers, ‘Behold, our enemies are routed; let us go up to purify and rededicate the Temple.'” (1 Maccabees)

Behold, our enemies are routed—Lysias besieged and breached Beth-Zur before the clash with Judah. The Seleucid force likely remained in Judea for about two to three months, as such a siege typically required considerable time. The timing of the retreat, around late December 164 BCE, suggests that news of Antiochus Epiphanes’ death in Persia may have reached Lysias while he was at Beth-Zur, prompting his decision to abandon the campaign before its completion.

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Lysias’ Second Campaign and the Battle of Beth-Zechariah

Following the death of Antiochus Epiphanes and Lysias’ retreat from Beth-Zur, Judah Maccabee took control of Jerusalem in Kislev 164 BCE. The Temple was purified, allowing the Hasmonean brothers to assist Jews scattered beyond the Judean highlands. They were under pressure from their Idumean, Samaritan, and Hellenized neighbors in Gilead and the coastal plain. In Antioch, Antiochus V, the nine-year-old son of Antiochus Epiphanes, was crowned, but real power rested with the regent Lysias. This situation cast doubt on the stability and continuity of the Seleucid dynasty, as Lysias aimed to seize the throne for himself. Judah Maccabee’s major successes in campaigns against neighboring regions, the consolidation of Jewish military power, and the internal crisis in the Seleucid Empire encouraged the Jews to lay siege to the Acra in the spring of 162 BCE, a year and three months after the Temple’s purification. This move, aimed at uprooting the last tangible symbol of Seleucid rule in Judea, provoked a sharp response from the Seleucid authorities, surpassing in scale and quality all previous campaigns against the Hasmoneans. However, despite a decisive military victory, the Seleucids once again failed to suppress the revolt due to internal events that forced a halt to operations in Judea and a hasty return of the army northward.

“The men of the Acra were besieging Israel around the sanctuary, constantly seeking to harm them and serving as a support for the Gentiles. Judah resolved to destroy them and called all the people to besiege them. They gathered together and laid siege to them in 150 of the Seleucid era. He built siege ramps and war machines against them. Some of the besieged escaped and were joined by some renegade Jews.” (1 Maccabees)

Besieging Israel—given the general situation in Judea and Jerusalem, this does not refer to a full siege but rather to harassment through assaults and artillery fire from the fortress targeting worshippers and gatherings in and around the Temple.

Called all the people to besiege them—Judah Maccabee had previously avoided attacking the Acra’s occupants, leaving them a “supply corridor” to prevent a massive military response from the central authorities. At this stage, he decided to attempt to decisively defeat the Acra, assuming that Lysias, preoccupied with consolidating his position in Antioch and internal conflicts, would not risk another military campaign to the Judean highlands.

Siege ramps and war machinesSiege ramps refer to elevated platforms for artillery, while war machines are a general term for artillery and breaching devices. Due to the limited number of machines available, their slow firing rate, inaccuracy, and relatively short range, they could not quickly tip the scales, requiring the besiegers to rely on additional methods like starvation or covert breaches. This allowed the Acra’s occupants to summon Lysias in time.

“They went to the king and said, ‘How long will you delay doing justice and avenging our brothers? We willingly served your father, followed his orders, and adhered to his decrees. Yet our people have besieged us for this, turned against us, killed those they found, and plundered our estates. They have not only raised their hand against us but against all their borders. Today, they are encamped against the Acra in Jerusalem, fortifying the sanctuary and Beth-Zur. If you do not act quickly, they will do even greater things, and you will be unable to stop them.’ The king was enraged when he heard this and gathered all his friends, the commanders of his army, and those in charge of the cavalry.” (1 Maccabees)

Our estates—the attacks on the estates of the Hellenized Jews likely stemmed not only from their vulnerability due to their confinement in the Acra but also because these lands had been unlawfully confiscated by the Seleucid authorities and granted to the Hellenizers.

All their borders—a reference to Judah Maccabee and his brothers’ campaigns beyond Judea’s borders after the Temple’s purification.

“From other kingdoms and the islands of the sea, mercenary armies came to him. His forces were one hundred thousand infantry, twenty thousand cavalry, and thirty-two war-trained elephants.” (1 Maccabees)

“They marched through Idumea and encamped at Beth-Zur. They fought for many days, deploying war machines. The defenders sallied out, burned them with fire, and fought bravely. Judah departed from the Acra and encamped at Beth-Zechariah, opposite the king’s camp.” (1 Maccabees)

Marched through Idumea—as in the previous campaign, Lysias addressed the challenge of penetrating the Judean highlands by advancing from the southwest through friendly Idumean territory.

Despite the heavy siege, Judah Maccabee sent the defenders food and supplies. A Jew named Rhodocus betrayed “secrets” to the enemy, possibly the routes and methods used to deliver supplies to the besieged hill. This betrayal likely worsened the fortress’s situation, forcing the defenders to surrender.

Judah Maccabee chose to confront the Seleucids near Beth-Zechariah not only for topographical reasons. The terrain between Beth-Zur and Beth-Zechariah is not significantly different from that further north toward Jerusalem. Judah likely feared, above all, harm to the Jewish population south of Jerusalem (as later occurred in the north during Bacchides’ second campaign). After the Temple’s purification and establishing semi-independent governance and military structures in Judea, the new Jewish leadership could not afford to abandon southern Judea to Lysias’ initiative. Past successes and the current strengthening of military power likely gave the Jewish command confidence that they could halt the Seleucid forces on their way to Jerusalem.

“The king rose early in the morning, and the camp marched with vigor toward Beth-Zechariah. The armies prepared for battle, and the trumpets sounded. The elephants were given wine mixed with mulberries to rouse them for combat. The beasts were distributed among the formations, with each elephant accompanied by a thousand armored men in chain mail, with bronze helmets on their heads, and five hundred choice cavalry assigned to each beast.” (1 Maccabees)

At the center of each formation was an elephant, flanked by heavy infantry—500 on each side—to protect its flanks. Cavalry guarded the heavy infantry on the flanks, 250 on each side. These “formations” were essentially a scaled-down version of the standard Hellenistic battle order, typically comprising tens of thousands of phalangites at the center, protected by thousands of cavalry on the flanks, with elephants sometimes integrated into the phalanx’s front line.

“They were ready before the beast arrived at its position, and wherever the beast went, they followed together, never separating from it. On each beast were strong, covered wooden towers, secured with devices, four fighters, and an Indian handler.” (1 Maccabees)

The fighters on the elephant’s back protected its vulnerable flanks, so there were four fighters per tower.

The remaining cavalry was positioned on both sides of the camp, intimidating and covering the formations. As the sun shone on the gold and bronze shields, the mountains gleamed with them, blazing like torches of fire.” (1 Maccabees)

The frontal formation described above was likely deployed in the “Valley of Blessing” south of the Etzion Bloc, on the road to Beth-Zechariah, clearly visible from “Tree Hill.” The low, hilly ridge running through the valley from Khirbet Marina eastward poses no significant obstacle to movement, requiring no change in deployment. The valley is 2.5 kilometers long from north to south and about 1.7 kilometers wide. A “heavy” soldier occupied 3 feet in this sector, with the entire phalanx 16 rows deep. Each heavy cavalryman occupied 3 feet, with cavalry units eight rows deep. The advance of the entire force along the hilly ridge crossing the valley would have been particularly impressive. Like mirrors on the opposite hills, the gleaming shields in the sunlight likely dazzled the Jewish forces.

“A portion of the king’s camp spread out on the high hills, many in the lowlands, advancing securely and in order. All who heard the noise of their multitude, the marching of the throng, and the clashing of weapons trembled, for the camp was very large and formidable.” (1 Maccabees)

In the northern part of the Valley of Blessing, the road splits into two branches. One ascends along the ridge (Russian Hill). At the same time, the other passes through a narrow passage, 80–150 meters wide and about a kilometer long, climbing to the saddle between Balutat al-Yarza (Tree Hill) and the hill to its west (Yellow Hill), where it joins the second branch continuing north, near the ridge of Jabal Habun, the spur north of Masrakh to Beth-Zechariah. Another natural route northward is the valley between “Russian Hill” and Deir Sha’ar (the Russian Monastery), but this passage is narrow and steep compared to the western passage. Thus, the only plausible identification of “the pass” is Wadi Shahit, the saddle, and the two hills overlooking it.

A portion of the king’s camp on the high hills—light infantry that, during the march, performed security and clearing duties. At this stage, the “light” troops were sent to seize the spurs overlooking the pass from the west and east, which were undoubtedly occupied by Jewish forces beforehand.

“Judah and his camp drew near for battle, and six hundred men from the king’s camp fell. Eleazar saw one of the beasts, which was taller than the others, armored with royal armor, and it seemed the king was on it. He died to save his people and make an everlasting name for himself.” (1 Maccabees)

The Jewish force likely positioned itself on Tree Hill and its surroundings and the spurs flanking the pass, preparing to force the battle in the pass itself.

“He ran boldly toward it into the midst of the formation, killing on the right and left, and they parted before him on both sides. He came under the elephant, thrust his sword into it, and killed it. It fell to the ground upon him, and he died there. Seeing the kingdom’s strength and the armies’ fury, they turned away from them. The men of the king’s camp advanced toward Jerusalem, and the king encamped in Judea and at Mount Zion.” (1 Maccabees)

Eleazar approached the elephant from its flank, requiring him to carve a path through the ranks of heavy infantry protecting its sides. Since the elephant’s head was armored, Eleazar had to strike its belly. The falling elephant crushed Eleazar.

“They made peace with the people of Beth-Zur, who came out of the city because they had no food to sustain the siege, as it was a sabbatical year for the land. The king captured Beth-Zur and stationed a garrison there to guard it. He encamped against the sanctuary for many days, setting up siege ramps, war machines, fire-throwers, stone-throwers, scorpions for shooting arrows, and slings. The defenders also made machines against their machines and fought for many days.” (1 Maccabees)

“There was no food in the sanctuary because of the seventh year, and those who had fled to Judea from the Gentiles had consumed the remaining stores. Few remained in the sanctuary, as hunger overwhelmed them, and they scattered to their homes. Lysias heard that Philip, whom King Antiochus had appointed while still alive to raise his son Antiochus to rule, had returned from Persia and Media with the armies that had gone with the king, seeking to seize control of affairs.” (1 Maccabees)

“In haste, he resolved to withdraw and said to the king, the army commanders, and the men, ‘We grow weaker day by day, our food is scarce, the place we besiege is strong, and the affairs of the kingdom press upon us. Let us offer terms to these people, make peace with them and their nation, and allow them to follow their laws as before. They rose and did all this because of their laws, which we abolished.’ The proposal pleased the king and the commanders, and they sent to make peace, which was accepted. The king and the commanders swore an oath to them, and they came out of the stronghold. The king entered Mount Zion, saw the strength of the place, broke the oath he had sworn, and ordered the surrounding wall to be torn down. He hurriedly departed and returned to Antioch, where Philip ruled the city. He fought against him and took the city by force.” (1 Maccabees)

The Battle of Kfar Shalma and Negotiations with Nicanor

In the autumn of 162 BCE, a palace coup occurred in Antioch. Demetrius I, son of Seleucus IV (nephew of Antiochus Epiphanes), ascended the throne at twenty-two. Demetrius had been held in Rome as a hostage since childhood under the terms of the Treaty of Apamea. After Antiochus Epiphanes’ death, upon learning of the succession crisis in the Seleucid Empire, he sought permission from the Roman Senate to return to Syria and claim the throne. When his request was denied, he escaped secretly, with the active assistance of the great Greek historian Polybius. Upon arriving in Syria, he likely gained the support of the Greek-Macedonian military settlers, the backbone of the Seleucid army and administration. Given their delicate position among the native population, these settlers sought to entrust their defense to a strong and stable leader who faithfully represented the legitimate dynasty. Antiochus V was too young for this role, and Lysias, who aspired to power himself, was not of royal lineage and could not expect broad support.

Demetrius’s rise to power was met with hostility from the Roman Senate, which did not forgive his escape from Rome. The Senate feared his assertive and dynamic personality and refused to recognize his rule.

Immediately upon taking power, Demetrius appointed Bacchides to lead an army sent to Judea. The size of the force is not specified, and no military confrontation occurred between them and Judah Maccabee. Following the bitter lesson of the Battle of Beth-Zechariah against a large army, Judah Maccabee refrained from provoking a sizable force this time. Bacchides installed Alcimus, a moderate Hellenized Jew, as High Priest in Jerusalem.

Nicanor was sent to Judea as a military and civilian governor. Stationed with his forces in Jerusalem’s Acra, he was aware of his numerical inferiority and thus sought to restrain the rebels through negotiations. At one point, he resorted to deception, attempting to capture the rebel leaders, particularly Judah Maccabee. When his plans failed, he launched a campaign against Judah Maccabee at Kfar Shalma. The battle, fought in the hilly terrain near Gibeon, failed the Seleucid force, though not a complete rout, as Nicanor returned to Jerusalem and continued to control the city and the Temple.

“The king sent Nicanor, one of his distinguished commanders, who hated and was hostile to Israel, and ordered him to destroy the people. Nicanor came to Jerusalem with a large army and sent a deceitful message to Judah and his brothers, speaking words of peace, saying, ‘Let there be no conflict between me and you. I will come with a few men to meet you peacefully.’ He came to Judah, and they greeted each other peaceably, but ambushes were prepared to seize Judah. When Judah learned that Nicanor had come deceitfully, he feared to meet him again and refused to see him further. Nicanor realized his plan had been exposed and confronted Judah in battle at Kfar Shalma. About five hundred of Nicanor’s men fell, and they fled to the City of David.” (1 Maccabees)

The Battle of Adasa and Nicanor’s Day

Judah Maccabee’s victories at Kfar Shalma demonstrated that the region north of Jerusalem was under his exclusive control. Nicanor, who ruled the Temple and city from the Acra fortress, faced the threat of a siege. Aware of his precarious situation, he threatened the priests with the destruction of the Temple to compel them to surrender Judah Maccabee. However, Judah did not heed their authority since most priests aligned with the Hellenized High Priest Alcimus. The threat was likely intended to deter the rebels from storming and retaking the city, with the Temple serving as a “guarantee” in Nicanor’s hands. The danger to the Temple indeed dissuaded Judah Maccabee from besieging the city. He also knew that a direct assault on the Acra could force the Seleucids to dispatch a large royal expedition, as occurred during Lysias’ second campaign. Thus, he preferred to wait for an opportunity when Nicanor would leave Jerusalem and strike him in open terrain.

In March 161 BCE, limited reinforcements were sent from Antioch. As the revolt of Timarchus had not yet been suppressed, the central authorities could not provide a large force. Nicanor, seeking to prevent Judah Maccabee from endangering the convoy on the winding, steep road from the Ayalon Valley to the highland plateau, left the city for Beth-Horon to meet and guide the newcomers to Jerusalem. Judah Maccabee did not attempt to block Nicanor’s movement to Beth-Horon or maneuver to force a battle in the challenging ascent or unfavorable sectors along the road to Jerusalem. Instead, he chose to confront the combined enemy force at Adasa, located on the edge of the plain in the Gibeon area. This strategy reflects the Jewish commander’s confidence, which can only be explained by a decisive numerical advantage over the enemy and a relatively diverse arsenal of weapons.

The battle, fought on the 13th of Adar, ended in a decisive Jewish victory. Nicanor was struck down early in the battle, triggering a hasty and panicked retreat by the Seleucid soldiers westward, with villagers from the surrounding area “closing in” on the Beth-Horon ascent and harassing the stragglers. Judah Maccabee regained control of Jerusalem, though the Acra remained in the hands of the Seleucid garrison. Nicanor’s head and right hand were severed and displayed before Jerusalem, and the event was commemorated with a holiday, “Nicanor’s Day.” The celebration of Nicanor’s defeat, specifically this time, stemmed from the joy of saving the Temple from his threats and Judah’s return to power in Jerusalem, similar to the establishment of Hanukkah following the city’s conquest and the Temple’s purification.

“Nicanor left Jerusalem and encamped at Beth-Horon, where a Syrian army came to meet him. Judah encamped at Adasa with three thousand men and prayed, saying, ‘When the Assyrian king’s men blasphemed, Your angel went out and struck down one hundred eighty-five thousand of them. So crush this camp before us today, and let the survivors know that he spoke evil against your sanctuary. Judge him according to his wickedness.’ The armies engaged in battle on the thirteenth of Adar, and Nicanor’s camp was routed, with him falling first in the battle. When his camp saw that Nicanor had fallen, they threw down their weapons and fled. They pursued them for a day’s journey from Adasa to the approach of Gezer, sounding the trumpets of alarm after them. People came out from Judea’s surrounding villages, outflanked them, and turned them back against each other. All fell by the sword, and not one of them was left. They took the spoils and plunder, cut off Nicanor’s head and his right hand, which he had raised in arrogance, and brought them to be displayed before Jerusalem. The people rejoiced greatly and celebrated that day with great joy. They decreed to observe this day annually on the thirteenth of Adar, and the land of Judea was quiet for a short time.” (1 Maccabees)

The Battle of Elasa and Bacchides’ Second Campaign

The victory at Adasa in March 161 BCE gave the Hasmoneans control over all of Judea. Judah Maccabee seized Jerusalem, and the Seleucid garrison was confined to its stronghold in the Acra. In the following year, Judah worked to strengthen his position domestically and internationally. His efforts culminated in a treaty with Rome, which included a formal clause for mutual assistance in case of war. Practically, the treaty did not guarantee military intervention. Still, it served to warn the authorities in Antioch of Rome’s growing interest in Judea and to signal the long-term threat the revolt posed to the Seleucid Empire.

“Demetrius heard that Nicanor and his armies had fallen in battle and sent Bacchides and Alcimus to Judea again, along with the right wing of the army. They marched by the road to Gilgal and encamped at Mesaloth in Arbela, capturing it and killing many people. In the first month of 152 [of the Seleucid era], they encamped before Jerusalem. They marched to Berea with twenty thousand men and two thousand cavalry. Judah was encamped at Elasa with three thousand choice men. When they saw the multitude of the armies, they were greatly afraid, and many slipped away from the camp, leaving only eight hundred men. Judah saw that his camp had dwindled, and the battle pressed upon him. He was disheartened, as he had no time to gather them.” (1 Maccabees)

“He was weary and said to those who remained, ‘Let us rise and go against our enemies; perhaps we can fight them.’ They replied, ‘We cannot. Let us save our lives now, return with our brothers, and fight them, for we are too few.’ Judah said, ‘Far be it from me to flee from them. If our time has come, let us die bravely for our brothers and leave no stain on our honor.’ The army moved from the camp and stood to meet them. The cavalry was divided into two wings, with slingers and archers advancing before the army, led by the strongest warriors. Bacchides was on the right wing. The phalanx advanced from both sides, and the trumpets sounded. Those with Judah also sounded their trumpets. The earth shook with the noise of the camps, and the battle raged from morning until evening. Judah saw that Bacchides and the strength of the camp were on the right, and all the stouthearted joined him. They routed the right wing, and he pursued them as far as the mountain’s slopes.” (1 Maccabees)

“But those on the left wing saw that the right wing was routed and turned to follow Judah and those with him from behind. The battle grew fierce, and many fell wounded on both sides. Judah fell, and the rest fled. Jonathan and Simon took Judah, their brother, and buried him in the tomb of their ancestors in Modi’in.” (1 Maccabees)

Judah Maccabee’s body was recovered from the battlefield during the fighting, immediately after his fall.

“They wept for him, and all Israel mourned him with great lamentation, grieving for many days, saying, ‘How the mighty savior of Israel has fallen!’ The rest of Judah’s deeds, wars, heroic acts, and greatness were not written down, for they were very many.” (1 Maccabees)

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